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In recent years, scholars, journalists, and citizens have turned 
to Hannah Arendt’s writings to make sense of human plurality and 
resist right-wing nationalist movements around the globe. This article 
discusses feminist readings of Arendt’s ideas of plurality, narratives, 
and politics and describes how these ideas can help critical literacy 
theory focus on both social groups and unique persons. For Arendt, 
the human world is a world of plurality because it includes not only 
diverse social groups, but also human selves living unique versions 
of group lives. This latter kind of plurality is difficult to see in some 
approaches to critical literacy. Arendt argues the plurality of unique 
persons becomes visible when people tell life narratives in particular 
ways. Given this view of plurality and narratives, the political question 
of who counts as members of a public is, in part, a question of whose 
stories are told. Arendt insists this question is not only a matter of a 
person telling her own story; it is also a matter of a person hearing 
her story told by others. These arguments can add new dimensions to 
critical literacy’s view of diversity and the politics of reading, writing, 
speaking, thinking, and listening.
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For almost 50 years, educators have grouped politically engaged 
forms of reading, writing, speaking, thinking, and listening under 
the heading critical literacy (see, e.g., Freire, 1970/2007; Freire & 
Macedo, 1987; Lee, 2009, 2015; Mira, 2018; Morrell, 2007; Pandya 
& Avila, 2013; Pari & Shor, 1999). Critical literacy focuses especially, 
but not exclusively, on the ways people use texts to challenge relations 
of power among social groups, including groups organized around 
race, class, gender, and sexual orientation. From this perspective, 
however, it is difficult to account for human selves without (a) 
equating a self with its groups or (b) construing selves as mere 
effects of discourse, desire, or other forces. We steer a course around 
these two alternatives by rethinking critical literacy with Arendt’s 
theories of plurality, narratives, and politics. Although these three 
concepts are discussed in critical literacy, Arendt’s distinct take on 
plurality, narratives, and politics can open new possibilities for critical 
literacy and contribute to efforts to “move critical literacy forward” 
(Pandya & Avila, 2013, p. 1; see also Lee, 2009, 2015; Mira, 2018) 
by highlighting aspects of literacy, power, and sociality that often go 
unexamined by literacy researchers.
Below, we describe how, for Arendt (1958/1959), the human world is a 
world of plurality, i.e., a world in which all humans are the same because 
all humans are different (p. 10). Specifically, Arendt observes how the 
human world includes not only diverse social groups, but also human 
selves living unique versions of group lives. This latter kind of plurality 
is difficult to see in popular approaches to critical literacy. Arendt argues 
the plurality of unique persons becomes visible when people tell life 
narratives in particular ways. Given this view of plurality and narratives, 
we explain below, the political question of who counts as members of a 
public is, in part, a question of whose stories are told. Arendt insists this 
question is not only a matter of a person telling her own story; it is also a 
matter of a person hearing her story told by others. These arguments, we 
write, add new dimensions to critical literacy’s view of diversity and the 
politics of reading, writing, speaking, thinking, and listening.
In this conceptual article, we answer the following questions:
1. What is critical literacy and what are some of its limits?
2. What are Arendt’s theories of plurality, narratives, and politics?
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3. How can Arendt’s theories strengthen critical literacy?
4. Using Arendt’s ideas in critical literacy, what new things can 
people do with texts?
By answering these questions, we do not seek to throw out all 
other ways of defining critical literacy. Critical literacy is too open and 
diverse a field to ground fully in one set of theories. We seek only to 
introduce into critical literacy some potentially useful ways of viewing 
plurality, narratives, and politics.
Before we begin, a caveat is in order. We read Arendt through 
readings of her work made by feminist theorists including Cavarero 
(2004), Benhabib (1996, 2018), and Butler (2018). We focus mostly 
on those of Arendt’s ideas important to feminist theory. Therefore, 
our contribution to critical literacy, shaped as it by feminist readings 
of Arendt, looks different from potential contributions that use 
Arendt’s ideas on their own. We neither attempt nor wish to take up 
all of Arendt’s arguments, which include questionable ideas about the 
nature of evil (Arendt, 1963) and the possibility and desirability of 
keeping younger students out of politics (Arendt, 1959). Despite these 
difficulties, feminist theorists show Arendt offers several useful ideas 
about plurality, narratives, and politics.
CRITICAL LITERACY
Critical literacy is not a strictly defined discipline, but an open and 
evolving field in which people use texts to explore and intervene in 
politics, broadly defined. The ideas and practices of critical literacy, 
writes Morrell (2008), come from diverse lineages, including: 
Platonic philosophy, which questions the world of appearances; the 
Reformation and the Enlightenment, which challenged elite control 
of the word and the world; Marxism; Freirean pedagogy; feminism; 
poststructuralism; and postcolonialism. Adapting these traditions’ ideas 
and practices, people use texts to disrupt the commonplace, interrogate 
multiple viewpoints, foreground sociopolitical questions, and take 
action to promote social justice (Lewison, Flint, & Van Sluys, 2002).
Of all the different strands of critical literacy, Freire’s work has 
been particularly influential in the field. Freire sees literacies as 
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social practices that play out in social contexts (see Freire & Macedo, 
1987). That is, Freire denies literacy is simply a matter of individuals 
acquiring technical skills of reading and writing. Rather, Freire argues, 
specific practices of literacy shape and are shaped by relations of 
power among socially constituted actors, such as oppressors and 
oppressed, bosses and workers, and teachers and students. Through 
literacy practices, including practices of reading, writing, speaking, 
thinking, and listening, people ratify, acquiesce to, or challenge social 
relations, whether or not they are conscious of doing so. For example, 
in a banking model of literacy, the teacher affirms her power over 
students by assuming students are empty vessels to be filled with 
the one correct way of reading (Freire, 1970/2007, p. 72). In a more 
liberatory model of literacy, in contrast, students and teachers rewrite 
the world to change group relations (e.g., by assuming students and 
teachers are partners in learning) and to regroup themselves (e.g., 
by rejecting names such as underclass and adopting names such as 
revolutionary working class). Thus, Freire’s influential sociopolitical 
account of literacy emphasizes the importance of group relations in 
reading, writing, speaking, thinking, and listening. 
Over the past three decades, several feminist, poststructuralist, 
and postcolonial theorists have broken open common binaries (e.g., 
oppressor-oppressed and boss-worker) to show how people use 
literacy to assume and remake multivalent (i.e., non-binary) social 
relations (see, e.g., Blackburn, Clark, & Martino, 2017; Brooks & 
Cueto, 2018; Richardson, 2013). For example, when a person writes a 
letter, she may use a non-dominant discourse of femininity occluded 
in a simple male-female theory of gender relations. That is, the 
writer may write in a way that is recognized as feminine by women 
belonging to a specific group (e.g., high-powered women physicians), 
but her way of writing in her group’s specific style may not register 
as feminine in a binary that assumes all women write in one way and 
all men write in another way. Moreover, given the intersectionality of 
social forces (see Brochin, 2018), a person’s performance of a non-
dominant discourse of femininity may differ from performances of the 
same discourse made by people of different races, classes, regions, and 
sexual orientations. Notably, although many feminist, poststructuralist, 
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and postcolonial theorists break with binary thinking, some still focus 
on the constitution of people as members of social groups. Below, we 
contrast this group-focused view with Arendt’s view of people as both 
members of groups and as unique selves.
Lather (1991) warns researchers against overemphasizing social 
categories—even non-binary categories—lest researchers let those 
categories occlude the flux and flow of social life. Rather than 
accenting the agentive function of group or individual identities, 
posthumanist writers emphasize the reductive and destructive potential 
within the act of recognizing living beings as fixed and “sovereign 
subject[s]” (Jackson & Mazzei, 2012, p. 81).  These writers stress, 
with Butler (2004), the performativity of subject identities—not 
subjects asserting their will to act on the world but rather the worldly 
assemblage of intensities of all sorts—discursive, material, cultural, 
natural—out of which human subjects emerge. Thus, posthumanist 
literacy theorists such as Ehret and D’Amico (2019) and Mazzei 
(2016) make arguments for detaching stories and voice from the 
human subject in order for readers to be affected or moved by the 
materiality of text. 
Ehret and D’Amico (2019), for example, while relaying the 
writings of a 12-year-old girl who had survived imprisonment in a 
Nazi concentration camp, resisted reducing her experience into an 
object of their analysis as literacy researchers: 
We wrote instead in a subject-subject-subject (…) relationship 
desiring to express what moves in the process of writing about 
writing with each other…how [our] writing moves through 
[the girl’s] stories [as] part of our own struggle to live while 
remembering our fragility, our own limitations as always 
posthuman beings. (p. 166)
Similarly, Mazzei (2016) cautions literacy researchers against 
objectifying human subjectivity. From a posthuman ontology, she 
argues, “the voices of participants cannot be thought as emanating 
from an essentialist subject nor…separated from the enactment in 
which they are produced, an enactment among researcher-data-
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participants-theory-analysis” (Mazzei, 2016, p. 732). Elaborating on 
this ontological shift, she explains the posthuman being is 
…an assemblage, an entanglement, a knot of forces and 
intensities that operate on a plane of immanence and that produce 
a voice that does not emanate from a singular subject but is 
produced, as noted above, in an enactment among researcher-
data-participants-theory-analysis. (Mazzei, 2016, 733)
Again, Ehret and Leander (2019) take up the posthumanist task of 
“eschewing the epistemological subject who is somehow separate from 
experience” (p. 9) when they ask:
How can we know the ways in which literacy affects our becoming 
different without making appeals to the a priori identities and 
unitary structures upon which postmodern representational logic 
rests? How can we live in and express experiences of literacy 
that feel like something without making those moments into 
something? (emphases in original; p. 9)
Our purpose is not to try to undo the promising work of affect theorists 
or posthumanist writers. Rather, we ask: What about plural human 
selves? If at least one chief aim of literacy studies is to hear the voices 
of diverse human beings, how can researchers and educators address 
unique persons without essentializing and reifying identities (see 
Ahmed’s (2007) ways of posing and answering similar questions 
about racial identities)? Clearly, human selves matter. Literacy 
scholars must navigate between opposing and seemingly irreconcilable 
needs: To hear the voices of unique persons and to resist reductive 
representation. For us, Arendt provides one way around this impasse. 
ARENDT
BACKGROUND
Over the past several years, people around the world have turned 
to Arendt’s writings to try to understand the rise of right-wing 
nationalist movements in Hungary, Germany, Brazil, Turkey, the USA, 
the UK, and beyond (see Stonebridge, 2019). Having fled the Nazis 
and lived years of her life as a refugee, Arendt experienced firsthand 
the dangers of right-wing movements and analyzed these dangers in 
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widely read books including The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 
and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963). 
Across her writings, Arendt focused on the fact of human plurality and 
investigated people’s efforts, through political action, to try to make 
plurality work or to try to eradicate it. 
PLURALITY
In her political writing, Arendt takes plurality as her point of 
departure (on the importance of plurality in Arendt’s work, see 
Benhabib, 1996, 2018; Butler, 2018). “Plurality,” she writes, “is the 
condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, 
in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever 
lived, lives, or will live” (Arendt, 1958/1959, p. 10). Crucially, Arendt 
argues human plurality is a matter not only of whats, i.e., types or 
groups of people (e.g., all humans, the working class, or women), but 
also of whos, i.e., unique people living as whats in ways that are not 
identical to other lives in the past, present, or future. On this view, 
whats and whos are bound together: Social groups are made up of 
unique human beings who regenerate groups and, conversely, each 
human being is unique because she lives new versions of group lives.
Consider, for example, Woodson’s (2014) popular young adult 
memoir Brown Girl Dreaming. In this book, Woodson uses poems, 
photographs, and family trees to tell her story of growing up as an 
African American girl. In Arendt’s terms, Woodson tells the unique 
story of her life (who) as an African American girl (what) and remakes 
the categories African American and girl (whats) by telling her story 
(who). Thus, Brown Girl Dreaming is not only a unique story of one 
life nor only an illustration of groups’ ways of being in the world; it is 
both at the same time. 
To see whats but not whos is to miss much of the plurality of 
human life. This mistake, Arendt writes, is typical of mainstream 
Western philosophy and social science. These intellectual streams run 
through critical literacy, bringing into the latter a tendency to focus on 
whats more than whos. From Plato to Locke to Marx, writes Arendt 
(1958/1959), much Western thought hits a limit at 
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the well-known philosophic impossibility to arrive at a 
definition of man [sic], all definitions being determinations or 
interpretations of what man is, of qualities, therefore, which 
he could possibly share with other living beings, whereas his 
specific difference would be found in a determination of what 
kind of a who he is. (emphases in original, p. 161)
On a reading of Brown Girl Dreaming that focuses on whats to the 
exclusion of whos, one can only see details that can be read as typical 
of the lives of all humans, children, African-Americans, or girls. The 
details that make Woodson Woodson, and not just a representative of 
social groups, fall out of the frame. 
The opposite mistake, seeing whos but not whats, is also common 
in Western thought. Arendt (1958/1959) rejects individualistic views 
that assume each person is born with a core essence that is later 
cultivated or suppressed by social groups. Thus, Arendt would reject 
the idea that Brown Girl Dreaming is a story of an individual trying 
to express her core essence through the social categories African 
American and girl. On an Arendtian view, who Woodson is emerges 
through her life history, her unique ways of living her whats. That is, 
Woodson’s unique self emerges as a story of the particular ways she 
adapts her groups’ ideas and practices to negotiate the forces of race, 
class, gender, and sexual orientation that work through her and her 
environment. Cavarero (2004) writes that if one’s self, one’s who, is a 
kind of design, then “[T]he design is what that life, without ever being 
able to predict or even imagine it, leaves behind” (p. 1). A self is thus a 
work in progress.
We argue below that despite its emphasis on diversity, critical 
literacy has trouble registering diverse whos-as-whats. By failing to 
account for plural whos-as-whats, critical literacy undercuts its politics 
of inclusion. This problem in critical literacy is, in part, a problem of 
understanding narratives.
NARRATIVES 
Arendt (1958/1959) argues that because who a person is emerges 
over time, accounts of a life require narratives, whether linear, cyclical, 
or otherwise. Thus, writes Cavarero (1997/2000) in response to 
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Arendt, the human self is a “narratable self” (p. 109). To ask, “Who is 
she?” is to ask for a story. Crucially, Cavarero writes of a narrat-able 
self, not a narrat-ed self because the latter term implies a life story 
can be told conclusively. However, because people can initiate new 
actions with unforeseen outcomes—a capacity Arendt (1958/1959) 
calls human “natality” (p. 10-11)—human lives should be seen as 
narratable, that is, full of events in the past, present, and future which 
people may or may not draw into ongoing stories of who they are 
becoming. Thus, the narrative—really, the set of narratives—Woodson 
presents in Brown Girl Dreaming is not the story of her life, but a 
provisional story that will change as Woodson experiences more of life 
and reimagines her past in light of new experiences. To say Woodson’s 
life or any life is narrated, or readable within the bounds of one 
coherent story, is to miss the twists and turns of a life that do not fit an 
established narrative frame.
Throughout a person’s life and even before she can speak, others 
tell stories about her, about the unique who-as-what she is becoming. 
For instance, the narrative of Brown Girl Dreaming includes stories 
others told Woodson about her early childhood. Given their early and 
ongoing exposure to others’ stories, humans come to desire hearing 
their stories told by others. Here, Arendt (1958/1959) notes the 
ancient Greek term for a flourishing life, eudaimonia, “means literally 
something like well-being of the daimon [daemon] who accompanies 
each man throughout life, who is his distinct identity, but appears and 
is visible only to others” (p. 172). Thus, for the ancient Greeks and 
Arendt, to know what kind of life one is leading—what kind of who-
as-what one is becoming—requires listening to others tell the story of 
one’s life. Illustrating Arendt’s point through a discussion of Oedipus’ 
story of self-discovery, Cavarero (1997/2000) writes,
[W]hat Man is, is said by a definitory knowledge of philosophical 
assonance—who Oedipus is, is said by the narration of his story. 
To complete the thesis, however, we must add a qualification: it 
is others who tell his story.
Indeed, for Oedipus, who he is, is the result of the life-story that 
others tell him. This is a polyphonic tale, as it comes from the 
narrative fragments that Iocasta, the pastor, and the messenger 
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from Corinth recite on stage in a dramatic assembly. (emphases 
in original, p. 12) 
At the heart of the narratable self, then, are relationships or desires for 
relationships to others who can tell one’s story.
Arendt’s theory of narrative differs from, but does not necessarily 
contradict, theories of narrative popular in education studies (e.g., 
Clandinin & Connelly, 2004; Gomez, Walker, & Page, 2000; Rossiter 
& Clark, 2010). The latter theories emphasize how people construct 
their lives and others’ lives through storytelling. People take up stories 
from their groups’ repertoires and adapt those stories to organize 
human experience. Arendt does not deny how people attempt to 
construe and organize lives with stories. Rather, she focuses on a 
different aspect of storytelling, namely, the necessity of storytelling—
and especially others’ telling of one’s story—for working out who one 
uniquely is, how one is becoming a unique who-as-what.
Below, we argue that although critical literacy addresses 
storytelling, it misses some of the ways storytelling drives the co-
creation of subjects. Therefore, critical literacy does not see some 
important dynamics in people’s efforts to build lives in common. In 
short, critical literacy misses an important dimension of politics.
POLITICS
Arendt (1958/1959) sees politics as a scene in which people co-
create who and what they are in the public life they share. Because the 
question, “Who is she?” elicits a narrative, politics crucially involves 
people telling stories about themselves and others, exposing to public 
view who and what they are becoming. Thus, for Arendt, storytelling 
does not belong to a realm of culture separate from a realm of politics. 
Rather, in an important sense, storytelling is politics.
Arendt’s account of politics raises the question, How should people 
create conditions to enable the public telling of certain kinds of stories 
and the public living of certain kinds of lives? In a world of limited 
resources and plural forms of life, people cannot create conditions for 
narrating and living all lives in public. Arendt, for example, worked 
to create public spaces where the telling and living of fascist lives 
would be strongly contested (because, among other reasons, fascism 
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opposes plurality as such). Politics, then, involves people deciding 
which stories and lives should be made public (i.e., brought to public 
attention and given public support) and which stories and lives should 
be made private (i.e., deprived of public attention and support; see 
Arendt, 1958/1959, p. 35; see also Fraser, 1990). 
Using Arendt’s lens, one can see the politics of public libraries’ and 
public schools’ decisions to promote some books and not others. For 
public libraries and public schools to promote Brown Girl Dreaming, 
for example, is to say the life of an African American girl is worth 
public concern and support. Or, in terms used by writers and teachers 
of children’s literature, to promote Brown Girl Dreaming is to say a 
public should include people who might see themselves “mirrored” 
in Brown Girl Dreaming (e.g., women and girls of color) as well as 
people who can look through the “window” of the book and see a 
life of public note (see Sims Bishop, 1990; see also Gangi, 2008). 
Extending this argument in Arendt’s direction, Myers (2014), an artist 
and author of children’s books, argues books are not just mirrors and 
windows, but also “maps” of political geographies that show which 
stories and lives matter and where different stories and lives stand in 
relation to one another. Similar to maps, books show possibilities for 
where one might go (possibilities for living new kinds of narratable 
lives), versus routes one must travel (ways lives must be narrated). 
On Myers’ account, then, it is important for public libraries and public 
schools to promote books like Brown Girl Dreaming to prompt young 
people to think, “These characters lived unique lives in different 
communities and we are reading and retelling their stories. Their lives 
and stories matter. I am living a unique life, as well, and the public 
sphere should make room for others to hear and tell my story.”
Furthermore, Arendt’s approach to narratives and politics offers 
distinct ways of critiquing texts. In a common form of critique, one 
(a) asks how a text represents social groups (whats) and (b) points out 
how the text’s misrepresentations of social groups extend patterns of 
inequality. Here, the critic objects, “That’s not what my/that group is 
really like!” Taking a more Arendtian tack, one asks how a text does 
or does not address or at least make room for one’s own and others’ 
unique stories as whos-as-whats. Here, the critic objects, “That’s not 
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my story or the stories of other people I know! This text tries to shut 
down possibilities for telling our stories of who we are becoming!” As 
Kottman (2004) writes, 
[T]he pain of hate-speech comes not solely from what one is being 
called, but from the fact that one’s singularity, a singularity that 
exceeds any ‘what,’ is utterly and violently ignored, excluded 
from these semantics. Put quite simply, it is the total disregard 
for who one is that makes hate-speech so painful. (emphases in 
original, p. xix-xx)
Notably, even anti-hate-speech, including texts produced through 
critical literacy, can disregard who people are, for instance by grouping 
people into monolithic categories of race, class, gender, and sexual 
orientation (for more of this critique, see Ellsworth, 1989; Fobes & 
Kaufman, 2008; Neumann, 2013). In Arendtian textual criticism, then, 
the critic asks not only how a text construes whats, but also how a text 
does or does not address or makes room for plural stories of whos-as-
whats.
CRITICAL LITERACY REVISED
An Arendtian revision of critical literacy does not require 
abandoning all of the field’s established ideas and practices; it 
requires, instead, seeing new dimensions of language and politics and 
taking up new ways of working with narratives. Therefore, Arendtian 
critical literacy still involves students disrupting the commonplace, 
interrogating multiple viewpoints, foregrounding sociopolitical 
questions, and acting to promote social justice (Lewison, Flint, & Van 
Sluys, 2002). Through all of these actions, as students ask how texts 
construe and relate social groups—an established move in critical 
literacy—they also ask how texts open and close spaces for people 
to tell their stories and others’ stories of becoming unique whos-as-
whats, i.e., unique members of social groups. For example, when 
reading Brown Girl Dreaming, students can note Woodson’s portrayal 
of diversity within the categories African American and girl: She 
shows how she and her sisters live different lives and became different 
people. In this way, Woodson opens the categories African American 
and girl to new and different ways of becoming. Taking an Arendtian 
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approach, then, students can see and expand forms of plurality difficult 
to register in traditional approaches to critical literacy. With broader 
views of human plurality, students can develop more expansive 
politics with more possibilities for narrating and living different kinds 
of lives.
A LESSON IN ARENDTIAN CRITICAL LITERACY
OVERVIEW
To teach Arendtian critical literacy would mean to teach forms of 
literacy in which students focus on whos-as-whats, tell each others’ 
stories, go public with their stories, and ask how texts do or do 
not address or make room for plural stories of whos-as-whats. The 
following plan for a secondary school English class illustrates what 
one lesson in Arendtian critical literacy might look like.
I AM THIS AND NOT THAT: A CUT-UP POEM
1. Each student reviews newspapers, magazines, and political 
websites and identifies one text (e.g., an article, Op-Ed column, 
or letter to the editor) that (a) discusses at least one of their 
groups and (b) ignores or closes space for the telling of the 
student’s story as a unique member of their groups. Call this 
text the media text. Put the media text aside until Step 6.
2. Each student interviews two people who are family members 
and/or old friends who have known the student for years. Each 
student asks their interviewees to tell one or two stories that 
reveal who the student is. 
3. Each student transcribes their interviews.
4. Drawing from transcribed interviews, each student identifies 
20 vivid words and short phrases that say something about who 
the student is. Each student writes each word or short phrase on 
a two-inch-by-two-inch square of paper.
5. Each student spreads her 20 squares of paper in front of her and 
plays refrigerator magnet poetry: She arranges and rearranges 
squares into an impressionistic poem that reveals something of 
who she is. When creating her poem, the student may add short 
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words (e.g., definite and indefinite articles) and make small 
adjustments to the words on her squares (e.g., she may change 
tenses of verbs).
6. On a sheet of paper with images important to the student (e.g., 
pictures of family members, their home, favorite places), each 
student makes two columns:
7. The first column features objectionable lines from the 
media text the student found in Step 1. These lines should 
communicate ideas refuted, even if indirectly, by the student’s 
poem.
8. The second column features the student’s poem
9. Students post their new texts (i.e., texts created in Step 6) on a 
wall in the school library or in a public library
10. At the library’s student poetry night, before parents, friends, 
and community members, pairs of students read other students’ 
texts. Trading lines:
11. The first student reads the first column, i.e., lines from the 
media text
12. The second student reads the poem 
13. After students read their texts, the whole group discusses 
whose stories matter in the public lives they build together.
By working through this lesson in Arendtian critical literacy, 
students do not focus only on the whats they are. Instead, by asking 
others for stories about themselves, students focus on how they are 
becoming whos-as-whats, or unique people living as members of 
groups. As Arendt (1958/1959) argues, it is especially in hearing one’s 
story from another that one sees who one is becoming as a social 
being. By rearranging others’ words, students participate in the social 
process of forming themselves as people in the world. Also, through 
juxtaposing their poems with lines from objectionable texts circulated 
in the media, students critique media not only for misconstruing social 
groups, but also for narrowing possibilities for becoming unique whos-
as-whats. Finally, by hearing others read their texts and by discussing 
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their texts with parents, friends, and community members, students can 
clarify their standing as valuable members of diverse publics.
LOOKING AHEAD
Although Arendt’s ideas have recently been taken back up by 
philosophers (see, e.g., Benhabib, 2018; Butler, 2018) and journalists 
and everyday readers (see, e.g., Stonebridge, 2019), few critical 
scholars of literacy and education have explored her work. Beyond 
Arendt’s theories of narratives and whos and whats, critical scholars 
of literacy and education might explore her argument that plurality 
is the condition of thinking and learning to think. Similar to Bakhtin, 
Arendt (1965, 1978) argues thought becomes impoverished or fails to 
get off the ground when people are limited or limit themselves to just 
one idea. Researchers might develop and complicate this argument 
by investigating diverse forms of literacy through which pluralistic 
thought becomes possible and teachable (see, e.g., Higgins, 2011). 
Critical scholars of literacy and education might also engage Arendt’s 
(1943, 1951) writings on refugees to analyze and shape interventions 
in current refugee crises around the world. Questions about refugees, 
argues Arendt (1943, 1951), always raise questions about whose 
stories can be told and heard in which publics. These ideas, as well 
as many others in Arendt’s work, might be developed, adapted, and 
challenged by critical scholars of literacy and education.
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